



The Impact of Regional Support on Growth and 













A. Cappelen, F. Castellacci, J. Fagerberg 
and B. Verspagen 
Eindhoven Centre for Innovation Studies, The Netherlands 
Working Paper 02.14 
 
 
Department of Technology Management 
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, The Netherlands
 
September 2002   
 
 
The Impact of Regional Support on Growth 













Address for correspondence: 
Professor Jan Fagerberg 
Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), 
University of Oslo 
POB 1108 Blindern 





* Statistics Norway 
** Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of Oslo  




   
Abstract 
 
The tendency towards regional convergence that characterised most of the member states of 
the European Union from the 1950s onwards came to an end around 1980. To the extent that 
there has been any tendency towards convergence since then, it has been at the country level, 
related to the catch up by the relatively poor Southern countries that joined the EU during the 
1980s.  Within countries, however, there has at best been a standstill. A particularly 
challenging question is to what extent regional support from the EU , designed to foster 
growth and convergence and improve social cohesion, has had a real impact on this situation. 
A major reform of the EU Structural Funds was decided in 1988. Between 1989 and 1993 the 
financial resources allocated to these funds more than doubled in real terms, and this increase 
continued in the following period (1994-1999). The evidence presented in this paper suggests 
that EU regional support through the structural funds has a significant and positive impact on 
the growth performance on European regions and, hence, contributes to greater equality in 
productivity and income in Europe. Moreover, there is evidence  of a trend break in the 
impact of the support in the 1990s, indicating that the 1988 reform may have succeeded in  
improving EU regional policy so that it becomes more effective. However it needs to be 
emphasised that there also are diverging factors at play. First there is very clear evidence 
suggesting that the economic effects of regional support are much stronger in more developed 
environments. Thus what comes out of such support is crucially dependent of  how competent 
the receiving environment is. Second, the results suggest that growth in poorer regions is  
greatly hampered by an unfavourable industrial structure  (dominated by agriculture) and lack 
of R&D capabilities. Thus, to get the maximum out of the support, this needs to be 
accompanied by policies that improve the competence of the receiving environments, for 
instance by facilitating structural change and increase R&D capabilities in poorer regions. 
Such policies must necessarily be of a long-term nature. 
 
  




Greater equality across Europe in productivity and income has been one of the central 
goals for the European Community since the early days of European economic integration and 
various policy measures have been introduced to help achieve this goal (the so-called 
“Structural Funds”). For a long time it appeared as if the regions of Europe were on a 
converging path and, hence, that the existing policies had the desired effect (e.g., Molle   
1980). More recent evidence has, however, challenged these perceptions by showing that the 
tendency towards convergence came to a halt in the beginning of the 1980s (Neven and 
Goyette 1995, Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996). In the decade that followed very little regional 
convergence occurred within individual EU member states (Cappelen, Fagerberg and 
Verspagen 1999, European Commission 2001). To the extent that there has been any 
convergence, it appears to have been mainly at the country level (catch up by the new 
Southern member countries). These findings beg new questions about the effectiveness of 
existing policies.  
  As described in section three of this paper the EU Structural Funds were reformed in 
1988. The objective was to make the funds more effective in reducing the gap between 
advanced and less-advanced regions and strengthening economic and social cohesion in the 
European Community.
2 Between 1989 and 1993 the financial resources allocated to these 
funds more than doubled in real terms. A similar increase took place in the 1994-1999 period. 
Several new policy instruments aimed at increasing “social cohesion” were also introduced, 
chief among them the so-called “Cohesion fund”. The reorientation of European regional 
policy, the increase of the budget and the recent slowdown of convergence all underline the 
need for a thorough assessment of the outcomes of these policies. The current discussion of a 
possible enlargement of the European Union, and the possible role that regional policy may 
play in an enlarged union, further underlines the need for an improved understanding of how 
these policies work and what the long-run effects are. 
So far, such assessment has mainly been descriptive (e.g., European Commission 1997, 
Bachtler and Turok 1997, Heinelt 1996, Staeck 1996), or based on simulations of large 
macroeconomic models (European Commission 1999, 2001). The first approach consists 
mainly of outlining what type of investments have been made using the funds, as well as 
examining the characteristics and performance of the regions that have received the 
investments. While such a descriptive undertaking certainly yields useful insights into the 
  3working of policy, and help us to distinguish between successful or unsuccessful cases, it 
cannot be seen as evidence of causality. Moreover, in most cases the sample of regions 
included in such analyses is too small to warrant any general conclusions. The second 
approach, i.e., macroeconomic simulation, has the advantage of providing more exact 
estimates of the growth effects of regional support. However, such estimates are arrived at in 
an indirect manner (as a shift in investment, for instance), rather than as an assessment of the 
direct outcome of changes in specific policies or support schemes. Furthermore, the estimates 
thus obtained depend crucially on the specific assumptions on which the model is based. 
Hence, it is possible that the results that come out of such simulations may depend more on 
the hypotheses underlying the model than on, say, what happens to regional support schemes.  
In this paper we will try to estimate the long-run effects of European regional support 
through the structural funds in a more direct manner. We have in previous work showed that 
differences in economic growth across European regions can be reasonably well explained by 
an approach that focuses on innovation-activities in the region, the potential for exploiting 
technologies developed elsewhere and complementary factors affecting the exploitation of 
this potential (Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996, Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniëls 1997, 
Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999).  What we will do in this paper is to include 
regional support through the structural funds into an analysis of growth and convergence in 
the European union in the 1980s and 1990s based on this approach. In this way we will be 
able to make a joint assessment of the impact of regional support and other growth-enhancing 
(or growth-retarding) factors at the regional level.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two we present new evidence on growth 
and convergence in the European Union the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis confirms that 
there is more convergence at the national (between countries) than at the regional level 
(within countries), and more for a group of EU member countries that includes the entrants of 
the early/mid 1980s, than for the narrower group of countries that had joined earlier. In 
section three we start to analyse EU regional support. We show that such support to some 
extent depend on factors that may have an effect on regional growth independently of the 
support itself, and this arguably complicates the analysis. For instance, as pointed out in 
section four below, the theory argues that lagging regions may have a high potential for 
growth due to a backlog of technological knowledge developed in advanced regions. 
However, because the lagging regions are also the regions that receive most support from 
European sources, it may be difficult to separate the effects of ‘catching-up’ and regional 
support. We suggest that choosing an estimation method that combines cross-sectional and 
  4time-series information may reduce these problems. Section four outlines the empirical model 
to be used in the analysis and its theoretical underpinnings, considers how it may best be 
applied to the existing data and presents the results. The final sections concludes and 
discusses the implications for policy. 
 
2. Regional convergence? 
 
It is by now well established that the distribution of regional incomes per capita in Europe 
became more equal after World War II (Molle 1980, Molle and Cappellin 1988). However, 
this convergence in regional incomes seems to have slowed down or come to halt after 1980 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996, Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999). This is in 
particular the case for the countries that were members already in the 1970s. But during the 
1980s three relatively poor southern European countries joined the Union and as might be 
expected, this has led to changes in the European growth pattern (including convergence). 
More recently the EU has been enlarged by three relatively rich countries (Austria, Finland 
and Sweden) as well as a relatively poor one (Eastern Germany) and this may also have 
affected European growth and the regional distribution of income in the EU.  
  This shows that when studying dispersion of regional incomes in the EU over time, it 
is important to adjust for significant changes in the number of regions within the EU. We have 
chosen to confine our study to the countries that comprised the union before the entrance of 
new members in the 1990s (with a definition of Germany that is nearly identical to teh 
previous Western Germany). Incomes are made comparable by using current purchasing 
power parities (based on ESA95
3). Table 1 presents an overview of dispersion of GDP per 
capita in the European Union for selected years between 1980 and 1997. Two different 
measures are included, the (regional) standard deviation for Europe as a whole
4, and the 
regional standard deviation within countries
5 (i.e., adjusted for cross-country differences in 
GDP per capita). The former is a measure of the degree of regional dispersion in the EU as a 
whole (irrespective of which country the region belongs to), the latter indicates to what the 
extent the change in the former reflects changes in dispersion between regions within 
individual member countries (the measures are normalised so that the numbers are 
comparable across years). We present these indices for three different samples, the total 
sample, the sample used in the econometric analyses presented later in this paper (actual 
sample) and a reduced sample that excludes the three Southern member countries that joined 
during the 1980s. The total sample contains all regions from the nine countries includes in our 
  5investigation
6, the actual sample is slightly smaller due to lack of data for certain regions for 
some variables included in the econometric analysis presented in section 4. 
 
Table 1. Dispersion of regional GDP per capita in Europe, 1980-1997. 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1997 
Total sample (105 regions)      
Standard deviation (std.)  0.31  0.31  0.30  0.27 
Std. within countries  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19 
Actual sample (95 regions)      
Standard deviation (std.)  0.32  0.31  0.31  0.28 
Std. within countries   0.19  0.19  0.20  0.20 
Actual sample less Greece, Portugal and Spain             
Standard deviation (std.)  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.24 
Std. within countries  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.21 
 
Note: GDP figures based on current PPS (ESA95).   
   
The table shows that regional dispersion for the sample as a whole changed very little 
between 1980 and 1990. But there appears to have been a decrease in regional dispersion (i.e., 
convergence) after 1990. However, this does not hold if the three new Southern members are 
excluded from the sample. In fact, in this case it appears to be a slight trend towards increased 
differences  - or divergence - over time. Moreover it does not apply to dispersion within 
countries (irrespective of whether the three new entrants are included or not).  Hence, what 
these numbers show is the decrease in regional dispersion for the sample as a whole after 
1990 is entirely accounted for by the catch-up of the three new member countries towards the 
European level. Within countries there is on average no convergence.   
 
3. Regional support in the European Union 
 
Regional support is one of the key policy areas in the European Union. The idea driving 
this set of policies is the notion of social and economic ‘cohesion’, i.e., the desire to reduce 
differences in welfare between regions in the Union. The first official regional policy 
initiative was the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975.
7 
Later on the European Social Fund (ESF, mostly concerned with employment), the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, aimed at developing agriculture), as 
well as several smaller measures were added (we will refer to the complete group of funds as 
  6‘regional funds’ or ‘structural funds’). Allocation of funds was initially done by fixed national 
quota.  
The structural funds went through several reforms (1979, 1984), until in 1988 a completely 
new system was devised. In the new system, several ‘objectives’ were formulated, at which 
the regional funds were to be aimed. For the purposes of this paper, three of these objectives 
are of crucial importance. These are: 
 
•  Objective 1, aimed at regions lagging behind in terms of GDP per capita, defined as 
regions with GDP per capita lower than 75% of the Community average. 
•  Objective 2, aimed at regions in industrial decline, as indicated by (high) 
unemployment and (low) employment growth. 
•  Objective 5b, aimed at rural and agricultural regions, as indicated by the share of 
employment in agriculture and GDP per capita. 
 
The other objectives (3, 4 aimed at unemployment; and 5a aimed at common agricultural 
policy) cannot easily be attributed to individual regions, and hence we will not take these into 
account in the analysis. In addition to the re-orientation of the funds according to these 
objectives, the 1988 reform increased the budget for regional policy at the European level 
significantly (table 2). A similar increase occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. Several new 
policy instruments aimed at increasing “social cohesion” were also introduced, chief among 
them the so-called “Cohesion fund”, directed towards the new and poorer member countries 
in the South.
8  
Table 2 gives an indication of the magnitude of regional support before and after the   
reforms of the funds. During the period 1980-1984, which we take as a reference for the 
period before the reforms, the average region in our sample received European regional 
support equal to around 0.25% of its GDP. Note, however, that this value is influenced by the 
fact that Spain and Portugal were not members of the European Community at the time, and 
hence did not receive any support. Without these two countries, the mean value is 0.36% of 
GDP. During the period 1989 - 1993 the mean increases to 0.84%, i.e., more than twice the 
level ten years earlier. In the following five year period  (1994-1999) the level of support, 
especially for  objective 1 regions, continued to increase so that the total level of support in 
percentage of GDP approached 2,0 % on average. If we include the Cohesion Fund, which 
came into operation in 1993, this number increases even further, to 2.4%.
9  
  7 
Table 2. Regional support in per cent of GDP, average over regions in our sample 
 
 1980-84  1989-1993 1994-1999 
    ex. CF  in. CF  ex. CF  in. CF 
Belgium  0.016 0.028  0.028  0.117  0.117 
Germany  0.024 0.020  0.020  0.061  0.061 
Greece  1.571 2.367  2.455  6.935  8.407 
Spain  0.000 0.685  0.727  1.620  2.087 
France  0.068 0.083  0.083  0.149  0.149 
Italy  0.293 0.484  0.484  0.743  0.743 
Portugal  0.000 2.863  2.962  5.934  7.110 
UK  0.162 0.157  0.157  0.169  0.169 
Mean  0.267 0.836  0.864  1.966  2.355 
 
Source/note: Calculations on data taken from EUROSTAT regional yearbooks and  European Commission 
(1997, 2000), “ex/in CF” means “excluding/including Cohesion Fund”. All data in current PPS (ESA95).   
 
As is evident from the table the countries that receive the largest amount of support 
(relative to GDP) are Portugal and Greece. Spain follows at some distance with Italy is in 
fourth place. Although the overall level of support increases sharply, the relative distribution 
of funds over countries does not change very much over the 1990s. For the period following 
the reforms there also exist data on national public and private matching funds. The provision 
of these funds is in fact a prerequisite for obtaining structural funds at all. On average, 
national public and private matching funds are about as large (in terms of budget) as the 
European funding. Public matching funds are about two-thirds of total matching funds. 
Although in the present paper we will not explicitly take into account the role played by the 
national public and private matching funds, it is worth noticing that such matching funds are 
indeed important for the recent EU regional policy, as one of the main purposes of the 1988 
reform was to strengthen the coordination between the regional policy of the Member States 
and the EU structural funds on long term plans and objectives
10.  
 
4.  Economic growth, innovation-diffusion and EU regional support: 
econometric evidence for European regions, 1980-1997 
 
Any explanation of growth differences needs theoretical underpinning. Economic analyses 
of differences in growth across countries or regions have mostly been based on one of two 
perspectives. The first, based on the traditional neo-classical theory of economic growth 
  8(Solow 1956), is based on the assumption that technology is a public good, available to 
anyone free of charge. This perspective puts the emphasis on capital accumulation as the main 
vehicle for reducing differences in productivity across countries or regions. Moreover, this is 
assumed to happen more or less automatically, as long as markets are allowed to work freely. 
The other, competing, perspective puts the main emphasis on innovation and diffusion of 
technology as the driving force behind differences in growth (Nelson and Phelps 1966, 
Fagerberg 1987,  Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, ch. 8). This perspective is based on a totally 
different view on technology, emphasising its public as well as private character, and the 
complementarity with other factors that take part in the growth process.   This leads to the 
hypothesis that without the ability to develop such complementary factors, countries or 
regions are likely to fall behind rather than catch up.
  
Previous research has shown that the predictions of the public good model do not fit 
regional growth very well (see, for instance, Sala-i-Martin 1996).  Moreover, the assumption 
of  technology as a (global) public good does not carry much empirical support. On the contrary, 
decades of empirical research on the creation and diffusion of technology within and across 
country boarders has shown that technology is often a very local affair, embedded in firms, 
clusters of firms, regions and countries (Dosi 1988). Although diffusion may  - and do - take 
place, successful cases normally involve a host of other, supporting factors (Fagerberg 1994). 
These are facts that any theory that wants to throw light on the convergence-divergence 
phenomenon has to account for.  
We have in previous work analyzed differences in growth performance with the help of a so-
called  “technology-gap model” (Fagerberg 1987, 1988, Verspagen 1991). This model,  based on 
the second of the two perspectives outlined above, focuses on the impact of differences across 
countries in innovative efforts, the potential for imitation and the capacity to exploit advances in 
technology for differences in growth performance. This approach, based essentially on 
Schumpeterian thinking
11, is consistent with the existing knowledge on innovation and diffusion 
processes. Many of the assumptions and derived predictions can also be made consistent with 
"new growth theories" that focus on innovation-diffusion as the driving force of capitalist 
development (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991). Empirical work on cross-country 
samples based on this perspective confirms the importance of national technological capabilities 
(and other supporting factors) for successful catch up (for overviews, see Fagerberg 1994, 
2002a). Thus, real world catch-up is far from the easy, mechanical process envisaged by the 
traditional neoclassical approach in this area. 
  9What we will do in the following is to apply this perspective to regional growth rate 
differences within Europe.
12 Assume that the level of productivity in a region (Q) is a 
multiplicative function of the level of knowledge
  diffused to the region from outside (D), the 
level of knowledge created in the region  (N), the region’s capacity for exploiting the benefits 
of knowledge independently of where it is created (C), and a constant (Z): 
 
(1) Q , where Z is a constant. 
τ β α C N ZD =
 
By differentiating and dividing through with Q, letting small-case letters denote growth rates: 
 
(2)  c n d q τ β α + + =  
 
Assume further, as customary in the diffusion literature, that the diffusion of external     
knowledge follows a logistic curve. This implies that the contribution of diffusion of   
externally available  knowledge to economic growth is an increasing function of the distance 
between the level of knowledge appropriated in the region and that of the region on the 
technological frontier (for the frontier region, this contribution will be zero). Let the total 
amount of knowledge, adjusted for differences in size of regions, in the frontier region and the 
region under consideration be Tf and T, respectively: 
 
(3)  ) / ( f T T d µ µ − =  
 
By substituting (3) into (2) we finally arrive at: 
 
(4)  c n T T q f τ β αµ αµ + + − = ) / ( 
 
Hence, following this perspective regional growth may be seen as the outcome of three sets of 
factors: 
•  The potential for exploiting knowledge developed elsewhere (diffusion),  
•  Creation of new knowledge in the region (innovation), and 
•  Complementary factors affecting  the ability to exploit the potential entailed by 
knowledge independently of where it is created.  
  10 
There are two major challenges when applying this perspective. The first has to do with 
finding indicators of innovation and the potential for diffusion, the second with identifying 
and measuring the ‘complementary factors’.
13 For innovation we use R&D intensity, defined 
as business enterprise R&D personnel as a percentage of total employment. We expect a 
positive impact of this variable. For diffusion potential we use, as customary in the literature, 
the initial level of GDP per capita in the region (log-form). The higher this level, the smaller 
the scope for imitating more advanced technologies developed elsewhere. Hence, the 
expected impact of this variable is negative. Regarding complementary factors, there are 
many candidates that can be defended theoretically and that we would have liked to take into 
account, from variables related to various types of investments (education, infrastructure and 
physical capital) to structural factors of various sorts. However, data are scarce, especially 
among the former.  
  The ‘complementary’ variables that we were able to take into account include: 
 
•  Physical infrastructure (kilometres of motorways per square kilometre), 
•  Population density (the number of inhabitants per square kilometre), 
•  Industrial structure (the shares of employment in agriculture and industry, 
respectively, in total employment),
14  and the 
•  Long-term unemployment (that is, duration of more than one year, as a share of the 
total labour force).  
 
Among these, we would expect the first two to have a positive impact on technology 
diffusion, since both a more developed infrastructure and a higher population density increase 
the profitability/reduce the cost of introducing new technology. Regarding industrial structure, 
it is one of the standard results in the existing empirical literature on regions that this matters. 
In particular, a high reliance on agriculture has been shown to be detrimental to regional 
growth (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996), among other things because of low technological 
opportunities, and slow growth of the market. On the share of ‘industry’ in total employment 
the expectations are less clear. Traditionally this sector – particularly manufacturing  – has 
been regarded as an ‘engine of growth’ (Kaldor, 1967). However, technological progress in 
recent decades has been more geared towards services than industry and many traditional 
industries have been characterized by slow growth. Finally we include the level of 
  11unemployment as a possible complementary factor. We interpret this as a measure of the 
cohesion of the broader social and economic system in the region. The higher the share of the 
labour force that is excluded from work on a long-term basis, the less well this system works. 
Hence it is an indicator of institutional failure, and as such it might be expected to have a 
negative impact on growth.
  For instance, it may hamper inflows of risk capital and qualified 
people, and encourage outflows, as empirical research in this area indeed suggests (Fagerberg, 
Caniëls and Verspagen, 1997). Long-term unemployment also leads to deprecation of skills 
and lack of learning by doing in parts of the workforce. 
To this framework we then add the regional support from the EU as another possible 
growth-inducing factor. Such support has both a short run (demand) and a long run (supply 
effect. While the former occurs more or less instantaneously, the latter may take several years 
to materialise. Since it is the latter that is of interest here, we have designed the test in a way 
that is consistent with relatively long lags between the investment and its economic effects.
15 
However, the way in which this support are allocated to regions poses a problem for the 
estimationl. As pointed out in the previous section  the most important form of support 
(objective 1 support) is allocated to regions on the basis of GDP per capita, which is also one 
of our explanatory variables. In addition, Objective 2 support is allocated partly on the basis 
of unemployment rates, while Objective 5b support is allocated partly on the basis of the 
share of employment in agriculture. Again, both variables are part of our set of explanatory 
variables.   
In order to chart the extent of this problem, we performed a cluster analysis with the 
explanatory variables of our model as the inputs. European regional support was broken down 
by objective (1, 2, 5b) in this analysis. We arbitrarily fix the number of clusters to five, and 
apply a so-called K-means clustering algorithm. All variables were standardised before 
entering in the clustering algorithm. We obtained one cluster of two regions, and four larger 
clusters. The cluster of two regions consists of highly urbanised small regions (Brussels in 
Belgium and Cueta y Mililla in Spain) and will be disregarded in the following. The 
characteristics of the four larger clusters are documented in Table 3. Note that because the 
data were standardised, a value of zero corresponds to the sample mean, and plus (minus) one 
corresponds to one standard deviation above (below) the mean. 
  12 




1 - ‘little 
support’ 
2 - ‘Objective 
1’ 
3 - ‘Objective 
2 & 5b’ 
4 – 
‘Intermediate’ 
Num. of regions  19  34  10  40 
Agriculture -0.74  1.05  -0.47  -0.38 
Manufacturing 0.51  -0.61  0.99  0.14 
 Unemploy-
ment. 
-0.49 0.45  0.33  -0.35 
Infrastructure  1.53  -0.64 -0.11 -0.20 
Obj. 1 support  -0.63  1.21  -0.55  -0.59 
Obj. 2 support  -0.21  -0.48  2.62  -0.12 
Obj. 5b support  -0.40  -0.48  0.94  0.39 
Population 
Density 
0.39  -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 
GDP per Cap. 
1988 
1.10 -1.03  -0.09  0.33 
R&D 1.42  -0.82 -0.25 0.08 
 
Cluster 1 is a cluster of 19 rich regions that receive little regional support from EU sources. 
We label these the “little support” cluster. These regions do a lot of R&D and have a well-
developed infrastructure. Unemployment is low. Cluster 2 is the polar case. It consists of 34 
poor regions that receive relatively much Objective 1 support. These regions are largely 
agricultural, with a low level of R&D, but a high level of unemployment. The two remaining 
clusters (3 and 4) have both medium income. Cluster 3 is a small one (10 regions) 
characterized by a very high level of ‘Objective 2’ support, and relatively high ‘Objective 5b’ 
support. As could be expected by the nature of Objective 2 support, these regions score high 
on manufacturing. The final cluster (4), labelled “intermediate”, is a group of peripheral 
regions, characterized by relatively bad infrastructure and low population density, but with a 
level of income that on average is too high to attract much objective 1 support. However, 
these regions do attract some Objective 5b support. 
  The conclusion of this analysis is that the three forms of European regional support 
that we distinguish after the 1989 reform are indeed aimed at different groups of regions. One 
can indeed speak of a ‘typical Objective 1 region’, and the same holds to  some extent for the 
two other objectives. Thus it comes as no surprise that the three forms of European regional 
  13support are closely correlated with various structural characteristics of regions, among which 
are the main variables of interest in our empirical model as set out above (Table 4).   
 
Table 4: Correlation coefficients between selected explanatory variables in 






GDP per capita, 1989 Long term 
unemployment, 1989 
GDP per capita, 1989  -0,79     
Long term 
unemployment, 1989  0,11 -0,31   
Share of agriculture, 
1989  0,81 -0,73  0,04 
 
 
As the table shows, it is the close relation between European structural funds on the one 
hand, and GDP per capita and the share of agriculture in employment on the other hand, 
which is most likely to pose problems in the estimation. The implication is that due to this 
high degree of correlation it may be difficult to separate econometrically – especially in a 
cross-sectional dimension - the effect on regional growth from, say, a high potential for 
technology diffusion ( low level of GDP per capita) from a high level or EU support 
(similarly for EU support and the share of agriculture in total employment). To minimize 
these problems we exploit the fact that there have been important changes going on over time 
in some of the dimensions taken into account by the analysis, particularly in the working and 
coverage of the EU regional support. Hence what we do in the regression analysis is to pool 
the data for the period 1989-1997 (after the reform) with the ones for the previous period 
1980-1989. To allow for changes in the working of the variables between the two periods, we 
introduce a first-period “time-slope dummy” (TSD) for each independent variable of the 
model. However, although we started out with time-slope dummies for all variables, only the 
ones that contribute to the explanatory power (reduce the residual variance) of the model were 
retained in the final reporting (using the general to specific method). 
As is customary in analyses on pooled cross-country time-series datasets we report 
regressions both with and without country specific constant terms (“country dummies”) in the 
regressions. The interpretation of the tests differ slightly, however, depending on whether 
these country specific factors are allowed for or not. The first (including country specific 
constant terms) is equivalent to testing the explanatory power of the model for the differences 
in growth across regions within each country (leaving the cross-country differences to the 
  14country-specific terms), while the second (a common constant term) implies a test of the 
explanatory model of our model on regional growth in Europe as a whole (irrespective of 
country-borders). 
The results of the econometric analysis are presented in table 5. As can be seen from the R
2  
the model presented explains regional growth well, but the version that allows for country-
specific factors is clearly superior to the one without and will be preferred  in the following. 
However, most estimates are robust to the inclusion of country-dummies. The main exception 
is the potential for catch up (initial GDP per capita) which is much lower when country 
specific factors are included. By inspection of the estimated country dummies we observe that 
there are three countries with growth rates that deviate from the average, Portugal and Spain 
that grow significantly faster, and France that grows a lot slower, than the others. This means 
that when country-specific factors are included, the catch-up of Portuguese and Spanish 
regions towards the European average is explained by these factors,  rather than the potential 
for catch-up.  
We also report estimates of our preferred model for two different samples, a large sample, 
identical to what we previously called “actual sample”, and a somewhat smaller sample 
excluding the three Southern countries that joined the community in the 1980s. The difference 
across the two samples is small in qualitative terms, but there are some differences in the size 
and significance of the individual coefficients. This holds, in particular, for Infrastructure, 
Unemployment and EU-support, which all had a larger impact in the smaller sample. The 
latter may indicate that EU-support is more efficient in “advanced” regions. This would not be 
totally unexpected since these regions may be assumed to have more developed “social 
capabilities” (Abramovitz 1994).   
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Table 5. Explaining regional growth,  European regions, 1980-1997*. 











Constant  0,060 
(5,79)    


















































































D-Greece    0,051 
(4,91)   
D-Spain    0,055 
(5,06)   








D-Portugal    0,056 
(5,69)   




Country-dummies No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0,483 0,910  0,924 
N  190 190  128 
 
*t-statistics in brackets 
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Concentrating on the larger of the two samples (and the version with country dummies) we 
see that in the second period all variables have the expected signs, and that the estimates in all 
but two cases (“infrastructure” and “population density”) are significantly different from zero 
at conventional significance-levels. This also includes EU regional support. The first period is 
a bit messier, however. First, the estimated effect of the scope for diffusion – measured by the 
initial level of GDP per capita – is appreciably smaller. Second, among the complementary 
variables “unemployment” ceases to have a significant impact (with an estimate close to zero) 
while “infrastructure” turns up as significant and wrongly signed. Third, and most interesting 
from the perspective of this paper, the evidence of a positive impact of EU regional support is 
much weaker in the first period. This pattern is in fact even more pronounced  for the smaller 
sample, for which there does not appear to be any evidence at all for a positive effect of 
regional support during the 1980s.
  
 Thus there appears to be clear evidence of a trend break in how European regional support 
schemes affect regional growth. To get a grasp of the quantitative effect of this we calculated 
how our preferred model would explain the difference in growth performance between the 
three poorest and the three richest regions of our (large) sample. The calculation showed that 
in the first period differences in regional support contributed slightly less than 0.2 % to the 
observed difference in growth. In the second period this contribution had grown to about 1.0 
%, a sizeable increase.
16 Although some of this has to do with the general increase in the 
amount of regional support, and with the fact that some of the poorest regions in our sample 
did not receive any support at all in the first half of the 1980s, an important share of this 
increase no doubt stems from the fact that the estimated coefficient is so much higher in the 
most recent  period.  
How sensitive is this result to changes in the set up of the test? We conducted a whole 
battery of tests of which some of the most interesting are reported in table 6. First we tested 
for a change in the length of our two time periods by moving the dividing year back or 
forward (not reported
17). There were some differences in the size and significance of the 
individual coefficients across the various regressions, but the qualitative result, a significant, 
positive impact of EU regional support (particularly in the second period), remained the same. 
Then we tested for the inclusion of a period-specific constant-term to take into account the 
possibility of, say, changes in the macro-economic climate from one period to the next (Table 
6, a). This possibility did not receive much support, though, since the estimated period-
  17dummies were not significant at conventional levels in any of the tests. But for the larger 
sample the inclusion of such a dummy did compete with time-series dummy for EU support, 
which now lost much its significance. The impact of EU support also became slightly lower. 
However, these changes did not carry over the smaller sample, which yielded estimates more 
in line with the base regressions (Table 5). 
Next we asked to what extent the reported results are affected by not taking into account 
the support through the Cohesion Fund, which came into effect in 1993. This is a tricky 
question, because although the Cohesion Fund has a clear spatial dimension, a regional 
breakdown of the support is not available. What we did, as an experiment, was to assume that 
it was allocated to regions in the same way as the regional support through the structural 
funds. However, including the support through the Cohesion Fund in this way did not affect 
the estimates at all (Table 6, b). This is not necessarily so surprising, given that the total 
support through the Cohesion Fund before 1994 was small. But in the longer run this type of 
support becomes quite substantial. Moreover, as previously noted, there is a substantial 
increase in other types of support as well from 1994 onwards  (Table 2). Although it is 
unlikely that this increase would lead to substantial supply effects in such a short time-span, it 
certainly has a demand effect. If the long run supply effects and the short run demand effects 
are correlated, as is likely, there is risk that we overestimate the long run supply effect. 
To check for this we do the following experiment. Based on existing macro-economic 
evidence
18  we adjust the level of GDP in the regions downwards by subtracting the 
(estimated) demand-effect from European regional support (including the Cohesion Fund) in 
the final year (1997)
19. The result of the experiment is reported in Table 6, c. The estimated 
effects of regional support are still positive and significant, and – as earlier – higher in the 
small than in the large sample. But the numerical values of the estimates are a bit lower than 
in the base regression (Table 5). The time series dummies for regional support are still 
negative, as in the other cases, although for the large sample the estimate of the dummy 
ceases to be significant as conventionally defined. Our interpretation of these additional tests 
is that the qualitative findings reported earlier are supported. But it is possible that the 
estimated effects of regional support for the period following the reforms reported in table 5 
are a bit on the high side due to the difficulty of  distinguishing between short-run demand-
effects and long-run supply-effects.   
 
  
  18 





















































(1,017)        
Country 









190            128 190 128 190 128
 





We have in previous work demonstrated that the process of regional convergence that 
characterized most of the member states of the European Union from the 1950s onwards came 
to an end around 1980 and that there has in general been little change since then. To the extent 
that there has been any tendency towards convergence, it has been at the country level, related 
to the catch up by the relatively poor Southern countries that joined the EU during the 1980s. 
Hence it appears that these countries, particularly Portugal and Spain, have benefited a good 
deal from their integration into the European Union.
20 Within countries, however, there has at 
best been a standstill. This paper, presenting new and more recent evidence, confirms these 
trends. 
A particularly challenging question is to what extent regional support from the EU , 
designed to foster growth and convergence and improve social cohesion, has had a real impact 
on this situation. In previous work we have faced great problems in finding convincing 
evidence for assuming a positive effect as intuition indeed would suggest (Fagerberg and 
Verspagen 1996, Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999). In recent years – following the 
reforms - this support has increased in importance and it is thus natural to ask what the 
consequences of such support are. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that EU 
regional support through the structural funds has a significant and positive impact on the 
growth performance on European regions and, hence, contributes to greater equality in 
productivity and income in Europe. Moreover, there is evidence, particularly for the more 
developed parts of the EU, of a trend break in the impact of the support in the 1990s, 
indicating that the 1988 reform may have succeeded in  improving EU regional policy so that 
it becomes more effective. 
 However it needs to be emphasized that there also are diverging factors at play. First there 
is clear evidence suggesting that the economic effects of regional support are much stronger 
in more developed environments. Thus what comes out of such support is crucially dependent 
of  how competent the receiving environment is. Moreover, the estimates obtained for the 
empirical growth model used in this paper suggest that growth in poorer regions is  greatly 
hampered by an unfavourable industrial structure  (dominated by agriculture) and lack of 
R&D capabilities. Thus, to get the maximum out of the support, this needs to be accompanied 
by policies that improve the competence of the receiving environments, for instance by facilitating structural change and increase R&D capabilities in poorer regions. Such policies 
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Appendix: Regions in the large sample used in the regression analysis 
(95+95 observations in the pooled sample) 
 
 
NUTS code  Name    
be1 Brussel     
be2 Vlaanderen   
be3 Wallonie     
de1 Baden-Wurttemberg   
de2 Bayern     
de5 Bremen     
de6 Hamburg     
de7 Hessen     
de9 Niedersachsen   
dea Nordrhein-Westfalen   
deb Rheinland-Pfalz   
dec Saarland     
def Schleswig-Holstein   
gr11 Anatoliki  Makedonia,  Thraki 
gr13 Dytiki  Makedonia   
gr14 Thessalia     
gr21 Ipeiros     
gr22 Ionia  Nisia   
gr23 Dytiki  Ellada   
gr25 Peloponnisos   
gr41 Voreio  Aigaio   
gr43 Kriti    
es11 Galicia     
es12  Principado de Asturias 
es13 Cantabria     
es21 Pais  Vasco   
es22  Comunidad Foral de Navarra 
es23 La  Rioja     
es3 Comunidad  de  Madrid 
es41  Castilla y Leon   
es42 Castilla-la  Mancha   
es43 Extremadura   
es51 Cataluna     
es52 Comunidad  Valenciana 
es53 Islas  Balearas   
es61 Andalucia     
es62 Region  de  Murcia   
es63  Ceuta y Melilla   
es7 Canarias     
fr1  Ile de France   
fr21 Champagne-Ardenne   
fr22 Picardie     
fr23 Haute-Normandie   
fr24 Centre     
fr25 Basse-Normandie   
fr26 Bourgogne   
  23fr3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais   
fr41 Lorraine     
fr42 Alsace     
fr43 Franche-Comte   
fr51  Pays de las Loire   
fr52 Bretagne     
fr53 Poitou-Charentas   
fr61 Aquitane     
fr62 Midi-Pyrenees   
fr63 Limousin     
fr71 Rhone-Alpes   
fr72 Auvergne     
fr81 Languedoc-Roussillon 
it11 Piemonte     
it12 Valle  d'Aosta   
it13 Liguria     
it2 Lombardia   
it31 Trentino-Alto  Adige   
it32 Veneto     
it33 Friuli-Venezia  Giulia   
it4 Emilia-Romagna   
it51 Toscana     
it52 Umbria     
it53 Marche     
it6 Lazio     
it71 Abruzzi     
it72 Molise     
it8 Campania     
it91 Puglia     
it92 Basilicata     
it93 Calabria     
ita Sicilia     
itb Sardegna     
pt11 Norte  (P)     
pt12 Centro  (P)     
pt13  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
pt14 Alentejo     
pt15 Algarve     
uk1 North  (UK)   
uk2 Yorkshire  and  Humbershire 
uk3 East  Midlands   
uk4 East  Anglia   
uk5 South  East  (UK)   
uk6  South West (UK)   
uk7 West  Midlands   
uk8  North West (UK)   
uk9 Wales     
uka Scotland     
ukb Northern  Ireland   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 This paper is produced as a part of the “Globalization program” at the Centre for Technology, 
Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo. A preliminary version was presented  at the EMAEE 
2001,  The 2. European Meeting on Applied Evolutionary Economics, Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria, September 13 - 15,  2001. Helpful 
discussions with Fabienne Corvers are acknowledged. 
2 For an analysis of regional policy in the EU, including its rationale and the need for reform, see Begg 
and Mayes (1993) and Begg (1997). 
3 European System of Accounts, ESA 1995, Eurostat/EU-commision, 1996. Hence these data are not 
directly comparable to the data we have used in previous papers.   
4 The regional standard deviation is calculated as the standard deviation of the log of relative regional 
GDP per capita (regional GDP per capita divided by the EU average for the same year). 
5 Standard deviation within countries is calculated as the standard deviation of the log of relative 
regional GDP per capita (regional GDP per capita divided by the country average for the same year). 
6 All members except three small countries for which there was no regional breakdown; Denmark, 
Ireland and Luxembourg.  
7 The historical description of European regional policy provided in this section is largely based on 
Corvers (1995). 
8  It might be noted that a further spatial objective (6) was added following the 1995 accession of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. However, since we do not include these countries in our investigation 
we will not discuss this policy measure further here. 
9 The Cohesion Fund has a clear spatial objective but a regional breakdown is not available. We 
include it here for illustrative purposes only.  
10 For a descriptive analysis of the 1989 reform, see for example Armstrong, Taylor and Williams 
(1994). 
11 Although Schumpeter did not extend his analysis of innovation-diffusion to the international economy, 
this seems to be a quite natural extension to make. Indeed, the so called "neo-technological" trade theories 
of the 1960s were heavily inspired by Schumpeter (Posner 1961, Vernon 1966). More recent analyses of 
international economic developments drawing on Schumpeterian insights can be found in Dosi, Pavitt and 
Soete (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). For a discussion of the link between Schumpeter’s 
work and post-war theoretical and applied work on growth and trade, see Fagerberg (2002, Introduction). 
12 The presentation of the model draws on Fagerberg (1988). 
13 All data for the variables described below are taken from the EUROSTAT REGIO database and 
measured mid-period (1990). In some cases missing data were filled in by interpolation. R&D data for 
the UK in the first period were estimated on the basis of less aggregated data from that period and a 
regional breakdown from a later year. Regions with zero R&D in the second period and no account for 
the first period were assumed to have zero R&D in that period as well. 
14 Industry as used here includes fuel and power, manufacturing and construction. The remaining part 
of total employment when agriculture and industry are deducted is services, which therefore cannot be 
included as a separate variable. 
15 In both periods we use data for regional support from the first half of the period, 80-84 and 89-93, as 
independent variables. 
16 Note that this estimate is likely to include the effects of matching funds as well, since these are 
nearly perfectly correlated with the support from EU sources.  
17 These regressions are available on request. The ones with a longer second period tended to yield 
higher estimates for the impact of EU support, while those with a shorter second period returned 
estimates roughly equal to the base regression reported in table 5. In both cases there was a marked 
difference in the efficiency of the support between the two periods (with a significantly lower impact 
in the first period). However, the explanatory power was higher in the base regression, implying that 
the division made fits the data rather well. 
18 The available evidence comes from the national level, and is based in different methods/models. Our 
reading of the evidence is that a short run demand multiplicator of unity seems to be an acceptable 
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assumption (Honohan 1997, European Commission 2001). What we do is to apply this to the regional 
level. It is possible that this is an overestimation, since import-shares certainly are higher at the 
regional than at the national level. 
19 Ideally we  would have done the same for the last year of the preceding period but since we do not 
have a regional breakdown of the support for that year, this was not possible. 
20 This may be interpreted as good news for the Eastern European countries that are in the process of 
becoming members. Note, however, that the performance of Greece has been much less spectacular.  
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